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Article
Antisocial Capital:
A Profile of Rwandan
Genocide Perpetrators’
Social Networks
Omar Shahabudin McDoom1
Abstract
Although popularly perceived as a positive force important for objectives such as
economic development and democracy, social capital may also be linked to less
desirable outcomes. This article highlights a dark side to social capital by pointing to
its role in a particularly pernicious phenomenon: genocidal violence. Drawing on a
survey of residents from one community that experienced violence during Rwanda’s
1994 genocide, I show that individual participation in the violence was partly
determined by the features of residents’ social networks. Perpetrators possessed
larger networks in general and more connections to other perpetrators in partic-
ular. The quality as well as quantity of connections also mattered. Strong ties
generally, and kinship and neighborly ties specifically, were strong predictors of
participation. In contrast, possession of countervailing ties to nonparticipants did
not reduce a resident’s likelihood of participation. Drawing on in-depth interviews
to explore the possible mechanisms behind these findings, I suggest participants’
networks fulfilled functions of information diffusion, social influence, and behavioral
regulation. More broadly, the findings suggest the importance of social structure and
social interaction for participation in collective violence. Relational data should
complement individual attribute data in predicting participation. The findings also
suggest, contrary to the neo-Malthusian interpretation, that the role played by
Rwanda’s extraordinarily high population density in the violence may have been
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more sociological than ecological in origin. The diffusion, influence, and regulatory
effects of social connections are likely to be amplified in communities where indi-
viduals live in close spatial proximity to each other.
Keywords
social capital, social networks, genocide, collective violence, Rwanda
Ever since Putnam lamented the significance of bowling alone for the quality of
democracy in the United States, the concept of social capital has entered popular
consciousness as a beneficial force to be promoted in communities. Yet this popular
perspective overlooks that the social networks and connections in which this capital
resides also have a dark side. Today, a small but growing body of research evidences
the vicious potential as well as the virtuous value of these networks. They can promote
coordination, cooperation, and cohesion to solve dilemmas of socially undesirable col-
lective action. Participation in criminal gangs, terrorist cells, deadly riots, and ethnic
violence has been linked to the interpersonal ties that bring and bind participants
together. These social bonds then can be harnessed for ill as well as for good.
This article extends the exploration of social capital’s dark side to a particularly
heinous and uniquely human form of collective behavior: genocidal collective
violence. It examines the extraordinary events observed in Rwanda in 1994 in which
an estimated one in five ethnic Hutu men mobilized to commit intimate acts of
violence, overwhelmingly in groups, and primarily against their ethnic Tutsi neigh-
bors. It asks the simple question of what determined the participation of one-fifth
and the nonparticipation of four-fifths of this segment of the population. It finds that
the answer lies in part in the particular interpersonal networks in which individuals
were embedded, which facilitated or constrained their participation. Participants
had social networks and social connections that differed to those of nonparticipants.
It was the particular features of these participants’ networks and connections that
facilitated their selection into the violence, while it was the characteristics of non-
participants’ networks and connections that constrained their recruitment.
Specifically, the article makes three central claims. First, the size of an individ-
ual’s network is an important determinant. Compared with nonparticipants, partici-
pants in genocidal collective violence possess more social connections within their
communities in general and more connections to other participants in particular.
Second, in addition to the overall network characteristics, the characteristics of
individual connections matter. Not all connections are equal and some connections
matter more than others. In particular, kinship and neighborly ties—when compared
with economic, social, political, and religious ties—are the strongest predictors of
participation. Related to this, the strength of a connection also matters. The stronger
the connection an individual has to a participant, the more likely he is to be drawn
into the violence. Third, countervailing ties to nonparticipants in an individual’s
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network do not lower the likelihood of participation. Individuals may have con-
nections to both nonparticipants and participants, but it is the connections to other
participants that prevail. I suggest several mechanisms may be at work in explaining
the significance of social connections. Networks fulfill the functions of information
diffusion, social influence, and behavioral regulation. Overall, the evidence suggests
that social interaction is a strong predictor of differential participation. Whether you
participate depends in part on whom you know.
The article begins with the theoretical framework for the relational approach and
sets out several hypotheses based on this. It then describes the research design, data,
and methods before presenting the results and alternative interpretations of the data.
It concludes with a discussion of the theoretical implications of these findings.
Theoretical Framework
The article’s theoretical point of departure is two simple but fundamental observations
fromsociobiologyand sociology, respectively. First, humans are a social species andnatu-
rally seek connections to each other (Morris 1967). Second, through social organization
humans are able to accomplish more collectively than as individuals (Durkheim 1960).
Social Capital
The contemporary notion of social capital flows naturally from these twin axioms. The
concept, however, has proved susceptible to diverse formulations. Its classical concep-
tualizations, originating with Coleman and Bourdieu, confounded the sources and
resources of social capital. Whereas its sources lay in the connections, networks, and
structures linking individuals and families, its resources encompassed trust, norms,
sanctions, information access, obligations, and expectations among other things (Cole-
man 1988). Thus, Bourdieu (1993) defined social capital not only as ‘‘what ordinary
language calls connections’’ but also as ‘‘the aggregate of the actual or potential
resources which are linked to possession of a durable network’’ (Bourdieu 2008).
Similarly, Coleman (1988) defined social capital not only as ‘‘some aspect of social
structures’’ but also as ‘‘a particular kind of resource available to an actor’’ or the sub-
stance that ‘‘inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors.’’
The more contemporary notion, introduced by Putnam, did not resolve the con-
ceptual confusion between the sources and resources of social capital, but did imbue
it with a distinctly positive connotation and extended its application from individuals
and families to whole communities and nations. For Putnam (1993), who originally
focused on the civic-mindedness created by participation in voluntary associations,
social capital might ‘‘overcome the poverty and violence of South Central Los
Angeles . . . or nurture the fledgling democracies of the former Soviet empire.’’
Fukuyama (2001) made similarly ambitious claims, stating social capital is ‘‘impor-
tant to the efficient functioning of modern economies, and is the sine qua non of
stable liberal democracy.’’ The concept also influenced thinking within the
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development policy community. The World Bank launched a ‘‘Social Capital Initia-
tive,’’ and one vice president stated ‘‘social capital contributes significantly to sus-
tainable development . . . . Without social capital, society at large will collapse, and
today’s world presents some very sad examples of this’’ (Grootaert 1998).
Such thinking has since advanced and theory now more explicitly acknowledges
the potentially dark side of social capital. Putnam refined the concept to distinguish
between bridging capital that links heterogeneous groups and bonding capital that
links individuals within homogenous groups. The latter is exclusionary of outsiders.
Portes (1998) has explained how social capital can also constrain individual freedom
and lead to excessive claims by group members as well as downward-leveling
norms. Ostrom and Ahn (2009) point out that the mafia, cartels, and criminal gangs
all depend on the cohesive power of social capital. Yet, notwithstanding the
scholarly rebalancing of the concept, its positive perception persists in popular
consciousness and in certain policy communities.
Social Networks
Although often conflated with social capital, social networks represent a distinct,
expanding field of research. They merit analytical differentiation from social capital
for two reasons. First, the distinction avoids the conceptual confusion between the
sources and resources of social capital. Social networks are a source of social capital
but are not the actual resources that comprise social capital (Lin 1999). Second, a
social network is a normatively more neutral term than social capital and can more
readily be thought of having positive and negative consequences.
As social organisms, almost without exception we each belong to some commu-
nity and are embedded in some network structure. Social network theories acknowl-
edge the empirical reality that our choices and actions are often interdependent
(Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl 1988; Gould 1993). We do not inhabit a theoretical
universe of atomized individuals pursuing choices and actions independently of each
other. What others choose to do influences what we choose to do. Atomistic
approaches that emphasize individual attributes in accounting for individual actions
overlook the importance of the social context within which individuals operate.
Given the interdependence of many individual decisions, social networks feature
in explanations of a wide variety of human phenomena, but their role is particularly
prominent in theories of episodic collective behaviors. They have, for example, been
identified as a determinant of participation in social movements (Snow, Zurcher, and
Ekland-Olson 1980; McAdam 1986; Passy and Giugni 2001), electoral mobilization
campaigns (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992), and political revolutions (Opp and Gern
1993). Certain scholars have argued more formally that social networks represent
another solution to the collective action dilemma. Ostrom and Ahn (2009) argued
that the trust generated through repeated interactions between networked individuals
facilitates collective action. Others pointed to structural characteristics of networks.
Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl (1988) first showed through computer simulation that the
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prospects of collective action increase as the density and centralization of ties
increase and the cost of communication decreases in a network. Gould (1993)
demonstrated that the effects of network density and size on collective action were
in fact nonlinear and contingent on how centrally located volunteers are in the
network. Siegel (2009) argued participation in collective action is a function of net-
work structure type—small worlds, villages, opinion leaders, and hierarchical—and
the distribution of individual motivation levels in the network.
A separate and growing area of research has recognized the sociological founda-
tions to participation in various violent phenomena. Social networks demonstrably
have a dark side. The study of terrorism has made important advances using social
network analysis techniques (Perliger and Pedahzur 2011). In civil wars, voluntary
recruitment in rebel movements is partly determined by an individual’s preexisting
friendship and family ties to other rebel group members (Humphreys and Weinstein
2008). The concentration of social ties in a community also mediates who is
denounced and targeted at the local level in civil war violence (Kalyvas 2006). In
genocide, preexisting social ties facilitate recruitment into the violence, as do group
ties forged through participation (Fujii 2009). In rebellions, participants are drawn in
through preexisting interpersonal ties and rebel solidarity is maintained through trust
among connected participants (Petersen 2001). In communal violence, the weakness
of interethnic ties and strength of intraethnic ties predispose communities to violent
confrontation (Varshney 2001). In riots, participants are better connected and more
involved in community life than nonparticipants (Scacco 2009).
I draw together these two separate lines of research—on the role of social
networks in collective action and in violent phenomena—to test hypotheses on
differential participation in collective violence. By collective violence, I mean epi-
sodic behavior that (1) inflicts physical harm on people or property; (2) is the prod-
uct of individuals acting in groups, not individuals acting alone; and (3) involves
ordinary civilians as participants, not security professionals such as soldiers, police-
men, or others already authorized and organized to use force. Collective violence
then encompasses a diverse set of behaviors that includes riots, communal violence,
ethnic massacres, pogroms, and lynchings among others (Tilly 2003). I examine a
particular form of collective violence—genocidal collective violence—where the
violence is additionally either passively or actively supported by the state. Collective
violence may become genocidal in character if the state deploys its symbolic author-
ity and material capabilities to support it (Verwimp 2005; Straus 2006). The state’s
involvement then affects the scale of the violence. It does not, however, determine
differential participation of individuals into the violence.
Mechanisms and Resources: Linking Social Networks and Social Capital
Although distinct research areas, there is striking overlap between social network’s
‘‘mechanisms’’ and social capital’s ‘‘resources.’’ Social network studies have gener-
ated a diverse array of mechanisms to explain how connections work: (1) information
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transmission (McClurg 2006), (2) norms of fairness and efficacy (Gould 1993), (3)
incentives and sanctions (Klandermans and Oegema 1987), (4) coordination (Marwell,
Oliver, and Prahl 1988) (5) peer pressures (Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008), (6)
social approval (Della Porta 1988), (7) social influence (Christakis and Fowler
2007), (8) identity (McAdam and Paulsen 1993), and (9) socialization (Morrison
2002). In social capital research, although ‘‘trust’’ is now the most commonly cited
resource (Ostrom and Ahn 2009), in its original conceptualization it additionally com-
prised (1) norms and sanctions, (2) obligations and expectations, (3) information-
flow capability, and (4) the absence of ‘‘structural holes’’ (Coleman 1988).
For coherence, I propose a unifying typology to capture the similarity in functions
of social network mechanisms and social capital resources. Table 1 identifies four pri-
mary functions: (1) diffusion: networks circulate resources, tangible and intangible,
among connected individuals; (2) influence: they alter the thoughts, feelings, and
behavior of connected individuals; (3) regulation: they encourage or constrain the
choices and actions of connected individuals; (4) cohesion: they build solidarity
among connected individuals and reinforce differences with unconnected individuals.
Importantly, these functions are not mutually exclusive. The mechanisms they under-
lie may operate simultaneously in a given network.
Hypotheses
Network-Level Characteristics. Social network researchers have considered the signifi-
cance of various structural characteristics of networks: size, density, centralization,
reachability, inclusiveness, transitivity, and connectedness among others. In predicting
participation in collective violence, I focus on the size of an individual’s network. The
theoretical logic is that the more connections an individual has, the more opportunities
he will be presented with to participate. Information on opportunities diffuses through
the network so that better connected individuals will acquire more information and
more quickly. Granovetter (1973) in his seminal study of job hunters found that a high
number of ties increased an individual’s chances of finding a job opportunity.Weak ties
in particular mattered for diffusing information as an individual could sustain more of
them, given the relatively low investment required and thus be exposed to more
Table 1. A Typology of Network Mechanisms by Function.
Diffusion Influence Regulation Cohesion
Information flow Homogenization Norms Trust
Idea contagion Recruitment appeals Incentives Identity
Communication Socialization Sanctions Bonding
Imitation Obligations Exclusion
Expectations
Peer pressures
Social approval
6 Journal of Conflict Resolution 00(0)
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information. Theoretical simulations have also identified the effect of tie frequency on
participation in collective action (Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl 1988).
Hypothesis 1A: The greater the number of social connections an individual has,
the more likely he or she is to participate in collective violence.
It is not only the number of ties to people generally but also the number of ties to
participants specifically that may matter. The theoretical logic here is that individ-
uals with preexisting connections to other participants are likely to be influenced
to participate themselves. The more participant ties they possess, the more influence
they may experience. Research on social movements (McAdam 1986), riots (Scacco
2009), civil wars (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008), and terrorism (Sageman 2004)
has pointed to existing ties to other participants as determinants of participation.
Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson (1980) in their pioneering social movement study
explicitly identified recruitment appeals as one particular form of influence other
movement participants may bring to bear.
Hypothesis 1B: The greater the number of ties to other participants an individual
has, the more likely he or she is to participate in collective violence him- or
herself.
Connection-Level Characteristics. In addition to the quantity of interpersonal connec-
tions, the quality of these dyadic ties may matter. Existing research has distinguished
connections in several ways: type, strength, thickness (multiplexity), symmetry,
stability, and direction, among others. Intuitively, different connection characteris-
tics may produce different effects.
I examine connection type and hypothesize that certain connections may be
more influential than others in predicting participation. Varshney (2001) distin-
guished between informal ‘‘quotidian’’ and formal ‘‘associational’’ ties within
an ethnic group and finds the latter better at reducing communal conflict in India.
Yet the panoply of potential connection types is richer than this dichotomous
categorization. Kinship, economic, social (friendship), political, religious, and
proximity (neighborly) ties each represent distinct forms of social interaction and
may also involve distinct mechanisms. For example, whereas kinship ties may
influence through love or affection, friendship ties may do so through peer pres-
sure or social approval.
Hypothesis 2A: An individual’s likelihood of participation in collective violence
will differ with the type of connection between him- or herself and the parti-
cipant to whom he or she is connected.
Tie strength is another theoretically important connection characteristic.
Granovetter (1973) defined tie strength as a function of ‘‘the amount of time, the
emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services
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which characterize the tie.’’ I hypothesize that stronger ties will be better at draw-
ing individuals into collective violence, given the high risk involved in such an
activity compared with the low-risk activity of job hunting. Stronger ties exert
stronger influence. The importance of strong ties in high-risk, costly behavior has
already been recognized in recruitment into activism (McAdam 1986).
Hypothesis 2B: An individual’s likelihood of participation in collective violence
will be higher, the stronger the connection between him- or herself and the par-
ticipant to whom he or she is connected.
Countervailing Connections. Ties are multivalent. They may serve to inhibit as well as to
promote participation (Kitts 2000). If ties to other participants represent a positive
influence on participation, then ties to nonparticipants may exert a negative
influence. Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson (1980) found that an individual’s
extra-movement ties reduced his or her structural availability to join the movement.
McAdam and Paulsen (1993) tested the relative importance of competing ties on par-
ticipation in a social movement and found that parents and movement peers exerted a
stronger positive influence on participation than did friends, religious figures, and civil
rights organizations. Alternate ties then may work to prevent participation.
Hypothesis 3: The more countervailing ties to nonparticipants an individual pos-
sesses, the less likely he or she is to participate in collective violence.
Research Design
I present evidence of participation in Rwanda’s genocide of 1994 to illustrate the
relational theory of collective violence. The project employs a multimethod
approach and relies on three principal data sources: (1) a survey mapping the social
networks of 116 residents from one Rwandan community; (2) semistructured,
in-depth interviews of participants and nonparticipants from two communities on
events during the genocide; and (3) a broader survey of 294 participants and nonpar-
ticipants across the country on events during the genocide. I begin with a synopsis of
the violence at the national level and in the chosen research site before describing the
data, research techniques, and robustness checks undertaken.
Brief History of Rwanda’s Genocide
Although certain historical aspects of Rwanda’s genocide remain deeply contested,
the following account is based on a set of facts on which there is a reasonable scholarly
consensus. In April 1994, a small group of Hutu extremists seized power in Rwanda
and initiated a genocidal campaign that targeted the country’s Tutsi minority for exter-
mination. All told, an estimated 507,000 to 850,000 Tutsi would be killed, along with
several tens of thousands of the Hutu majority, by the time the violence ended some
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100 days later (Prunier 1998; Des Forges 1999). The killers were soldiers, police, mili-
tia, and ordinary Rwandans. The genocide was the culmination of a civil war, begun in
October 1990 and fought between a mainly Tutsi rebel army, the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF), and Rwanda’s Hutu-dominated government. The war’s roots lie in a rev-
olution, shortly before Rwanda’s independence from Belgium in 1962, which toppled
the long-standing Tutsi monarchy and installed Rwanda’s first Hutu Republic that
would exclude Tutsi from political power for the next three decades. The revolu-
tion had sent hundreds of thousands of Tutsi into exile, and these exiles would
make several unsuccessful armed attempts in the 1960s to return to Rwanda. How-
ever, it was not until the exiles’ descendants initiated the civil war in 1990 and the
reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1991 that the Hutu monopoly on power
would weaken. In August 1993, the international community brokered a peace deal
that envisaged power sharing between the incumbent regime, the newly formed
opposition parties, and the rebel RPF. Hutu hardliners opposed the deal, however,
and when Rwanda’s Hutu president was assassinated on April 6, 1994 (by assas-
sins still unknown), these hardliners seized the opportunity to take control, reignite
the civil war, and initiate the genocide. The international community failed to
intervene, and it was not until the RPF finally defeated the extremist government
in July 1994 that the killing would end.
Explanations of the genocide abound. The cornucopia of contributing factors
suggested include Rwanda’s move to democratize, the ongoing civil war, intense
demographic pressure on land, ethnic fears, ethnic hatred, a racist ideology, abject
poverty, a strong state, an obedient population, the colonial legacy, and indifference
from the international community, among others. While scholars contest the relative
importance of these factors, there is little disagreement on the genocide’s extraordi-
nary characteristics. Rwanda experienced collective violence on a massive scale. In
just over 100 days, an estimated three quarters of its Tutsi minority were eliminated.
Furthermore, Rwandans mobilized as soon as one day following the president’s
assassination, and by one estimate, one in five Hutu men between fifteen and
fifty-four years old committed an act of violence (McDoom 2009).1 Overwhel-
mingly, in rural communities the violence was conducted in groups, by ordinary
civilians, and sometimes with, sometimes without the support of local state author-
ities (Straus 2006). Tilly (2003) recognizes Rwanda’s massacres as archetypal
collective violence. Yet, notwithstanding the extraordinary speed and scale of civil-
ian mobilization, it is important to remember four in five Hutu men did not commit
violence. It is this statistic that motivates the central research question of this project.
Profile of Research Site
I surveyed sector Tare in Butare prefecture in southwestern Rwanda. Tare was a
demographically representative community for Rwanda. In 1994, it comprised
647 households and 6.3 percent of its population was ethnic Tutsi, in line with
national averages.2 Its experience of the genocide was also not atypical. In all,
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63 percent of its Tutsi population were eliminated and 24 percent of its adult Hutu
male population were implicated. Tare was also one of the pilot sectors for gacaca,
Rwanda’s experimental system of local courts created to foster truth, justice, and
reconciliation following the genocide. As a pilot, Tare was one of the first sectors
to complete the gacaca process. Comprehensive microdata on participants and
victims then were available at the time I was in the field in 2009.
Tare experienced three principal episodes of violence on April 19, 21, and 22,
1994. It did not erupt into violence immediately after the assassination of the pres-
ident on April 6, 1994. The delay was due to the local prefect of Butare prefecture,
Jean-Baptiste Habyarimana, himself a Tutsi. Habyarimana had resisted directives
from the new Hutu extremist government in the capital, Kigali, and had managed
to keep the peace in the prefecture for nearly two weeks. In response, Rwanda’s
new Hutu hard-liner president, Sindikubwabo, visited Butare on April 18 to
replace and assassinate the rebellious prefect. Having done so, later that same day
President Sindikubwabo traveled to Maraba commune, where sector Tare was
located, and incited the Hutu population to attack the Simbi Parish church where
a large number of Tutsi had gathered. His speech signaled the start of the genocide
in the prefecture.
Tare’s Tutsi left their homes that same evening and many sought refuge in a local
church, Rugango. The following morning, April 19, a group of Hutu men from Tare
launched the first attack against a group of Tutsi gathered in the nearby Sovu health
center. This first attack, however, was repelled. The next day, April 20, a security
meeting was held in Tare and a new plan of action made to attack the Tutsi in the
Rugango church. On the morning of April 21, a large group of Hutu men confronted
and killed the Tutsi at Rugango and in the afternoon went on to kill those gathered at
the Gihindamuyaga monastery close by. The following day, a renewed attack was
made against the Sovu health center that was successful. The majority of Tare’s
Tutsi were killed in these three attacks. The hunt for the remainder, however,
continued until the rebel army reached the area on July 2, 1994.
Data and Method
A total of 116 individuals from among Tare’s 647 households were surveyed to obtain
data on their individual egocentric networks. The sample was stratified by participant
status and comprised seventy-nine nonparticipants and thirty-seven participants in the
genocide. Participants were selected randomly from a list of convicted perpetrators.
Nonparticipant respondents were selected from a census list of all Tare inhabitants
resident in the sector in April 1994. The census list was compiled from a series of
smaller lists drawn up by Tare’s nyumbakumi, representatives of blocs of about ten
households, as part of the national gacaca process. The nonparticipant stratum purpo-
sively sampled male Hutu residents aged fourteen and older to ensure the most realis-
tic comparison with participants. I personally conducted the interviews with prison
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inmates using a Rwandan interpreter and trained a team of ten Rwandan enumerators
to administer the questionnaire to those at liberty within the community.
Given the sensitive subject matter, self-reports of personal connections to genocide
perpetrators may be biased toward underestimating the true number. I purposively
chose a community where the gacaca process had been completed to reduce the anxi-
ety of self-incrimination. I additionally relied on two distinct techniques to collect data
on individual’s social networks: a roster and a name generator. Neither technique
revealed to the respondent that I knew who the killers and nonkillers were in the
community or that the purpose was to identify their connections to these two groups
specifically. The roster technique involved reading a list of thirty named individuals
from Tare to each respondent and asking him which of the thirty individuals he
personally knew. The thirty individuals comprised fifteen participants and fifteen
nonparticipants from Tare selected at random and whose names were also listed ran-
domly on the survey questionnaire. If a respondent knew one of the thirty individuals,
he was then asked to specify his connection to the individual. Respondents could
specify more than one connection to a particular individual to allow for multiplexity.
Importantly, the questionnaire asked for connections before the genocide. While clear
for kinship relations, for other types of connections respondents were asked to specify
when they first met an individual. If uncertain, enumerators were trained to prompt
respondents using key life events as temporal markers. Respondents, for example,
were asked whether the relationship was first established at school, before marriage,
after children, or while their parents were still alive.
The second name generator technique reversed the roster technique. It involved
first specifying a connection type and then asking respondents to name individuals
connected to them in this way. To establish the range of most common connections
between individuals in the community, I conducted a focused group interview
with eight Tare residents. Altogether thirty-four different types of connections were
identified that I recoded as kinship, economic, social, neighborly, religious, and
political ties.
To corroborate and contextualize the quantitative network data, the project also
included in-depth interviews with residents from Tare and a second nearby commu-
nity, Zivu. I purposively interviewed participants and nonparticipants from each
community identified as reliable and willing informants. For nonparticipants, a
preliminary indicator of reliability was membership of the gacaca committee, and
for participants, their status as self-confessed convicts. The interviews were semi-
structured and covered, inter alia, events in respondents’ communities during the
genocide. I conducted interviews using an interpreter and changed interviewees’
names reported in this article to safeguard their anonymity. To improve the general-
izability of the interviews, I also conducted a stratified two-stage cluster survey of
294 Rwandans from across the country. The stratification was by region and by par-
ticipant status and comprised 151 northern respondents and 143 southern respon-
dents. The survey instrument posed questions to 273 Hutu and twenty-one Tutsi
respondents relating to events in their communities during the genocide.
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Dependent Variable
The dependent variable took a binary form of participant/nonparticipant. Participa-
tion was defined as the commission of at least one act of violence against the person
during the genocide. While a superior dependent variable would have been contin-
uous in nature, no reliable data on the quantum of violence committed by individuals
were available. Participation in the genocide involved many acts other than violence:
looting, manning roadblocks, mounting night patrols, denouncing individuals, and
encouraging participants among others. Nonetheless, an act of violence against the
person represented an important threshold in antisocial behavior to cross, and this
category of participant was distinguished to be consistent with other studies measur-
ing participation in Rwanda’s genocide (Straus 2006).
To distinguish participants from nonparticipants, I compared the official list of per-
petrators convicted through the gacaca process with an unofficial list of perpetrators
identified by prison inmates already convicted of genocide crimes in Tare. To mini-
mize measurement error, an individual was classified as a participant only if his name
appeared on both lists. To compare the networks of participants against nonpartici-
pants, I conducted t-tests on the difference in mean number of ties and multivariate
logistic regressions to measure the relative importance of the quantity and quality
of ties using the binary dependent variable of participant/nonparticipant.
Robustness Checks and Control Variables
Four principal robustness checks were undertaken. First, as described, network data
were generated using both roster and name generator techniques. Reliance on two
techniques minimized the risk that respondents, either intentionally or unintention-
ally, misreported their connections to others in the community. Second, two alter-
nate dependent variables of participation were tested: convicts and suspects. As
perpetrators may have subverted the gacaca process and distorted trial outcomes
through the co-optation of judges or intimidation of witnesses, I looked at both those
initially accused and those finally convicted. Results from the name generator tech-
nique and from specifying suspects as the dependent variable may be found in an
online appendix on the author’s personal website. Third, I tested and reported sep-
arately the multivariate models using backward stepwise elimination to exclude
unnecessary variables and to confirm the significance of included variables. Fourth,
I tested for multicollinearity and determined variables exhibited no problematic lev-
els of correlation. Finally, there were no missing data for the 116 respondents, no
individual was an isolate with connections to no one else, and only one individual
reported a homogenous network of nonparticipants only.
The identification of suitable controls was not obvious as the extant literature is
divided between an emerging consensus that genocide perpetrators are ‘‘ordinary’’
with few distinguishing attributes and studies that examine individual-level
characteristics to predict participation. I favored caution and included controls
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for age, marital status, education, ideological commitment (proxied by support of
an opposition political party), occupation, and wealth measured objectively (prox-
ied by ownership of cows) and subjectively. There were no controls for gender or
ethnicity as the sample purposively comprised Hutu males only.
Results
Network-Level Characteristics
The size of an individual’s network is a robust predictor of participation. Participants
possessed significantly larger social networks than nonparticipants. The descriptive sta-
tistics in Table 2 indicate that the mean number of connections to other residents listed
on the roster reported by convicted participantswas twenty comparedwith only thirteen
connections reported by nonparticipants. The difference inmeans is statistically signif-
icant for both convicted and suspected participants. Themultivariate logisticmodel cor-
roborates this finding, controlling for individual-level attributes, and shows that for each
additional resident to whom a resident was connected, the odds of their participation
increased by 9 percent (Table 3, model 1). This finding holds for convicted participants
and suspected participants. Hypothesis 1A was confirmed. Participants were signifi-
cantly better connected in their community than were nonparticipants.
Itwasnotmerelyhavinga larger social network thatmattered, however. Itwas also the
particular individuals in this network who were important. The more participants, as
opposed to nonparticipants, in a resident’s network, the more likely the resident was to
participate in the violence. Convicts, on average, were connected to eleven other partici-
pants compared to only six for nonparticipants. Suspects had ten participant and six non-
participant ties on average. Themultivariatemodels confirm this finding and indicate that
each additional participant to whom a resident was connected increased the odds of the
resident also participating by a remarkable 24 percent for convicts (Table 3,model 2) and
15 percent for suspects. The finding is also robust to the use of the name generator tech-
nique instead of the rostermethod.Hypothesis 1Bwas also confirmed.Themore connec-
tions a resident has to other participants, the more likely he is to participate himself.
Connection Characteristics
Connection Type. The descriptive statistics prima facie suggest that kinship, prox-
imity (neighborly), social (friendship), and economic connections were more
important for participation than political or religious ties. However, when all six
types of connections are specified in the multivariate model, the only significant
connections that persist are those based on kinship and proximity. For each addi-
tional family member who participated in the violence, the odds of the related
individual also participating increased by a noteworthy 75 percent for convicts
(Table 4, model 5) and 51 percent for suspects. The ‘‘name generator’’ model
corroborated the significance of family ties identified in the roster model. The
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics Comparing Participants and Nonparticipants.
Nonconvicts
Convicts
only
All
nonsuspects
All
suspects
Age (years) 35.52 35.86 35.88 35.27
Marital status (married) 0.62 0.78* 0.60 0.77*
Occupation status (nonfarmer) 0.06 0.24*** 0.07 0.19*
Education (years) 3.84 3.38 3.99 3.27
Wealth subjective (poor) 0.73 0.76 0.84 0.60
Wealth objective (cows owned) 0.49 0.41 0.51 0.40
Opposition support (yes) 0.46 0.54 0.43 0.56
All ties 12.73 20.16*** 12.24 19.17***
To nonparticipants 6.30 9.03*** 6.01 8.81***
To participants 6.43 11.14*** 6.22 10.35***
Voluntary ties
To all residents 1.73 2.16 1.59 2.25
To nonparticipants 0.78 0.84 0.72 0.92
To participants 0.95 1.30 0.87 1.33
Involuntary ties
To all residents 1.53 3.00** 1.46 2.77**
To nonparticipants 0.73 0.86 0.68 0.92
To participants 0.80 2.14*** 0.78 1.85***
Kinship ties
To all residents 1.87 3.62*** 1.72 3.44***
To nonparticipants 0.94 1.22 0.87 1.25
To participants 0.94 2.41*** 0.85 2.19***
Economic ties
To all residents 0.70 1.24 0.57 1.29**
To nonparticipants 0.41 0.41 0.32 0.52
To participants 0.29 0.84** 0.25 0.77**
Social ties
To all residents 0.96 1.38 0.78 1.54*
To nonparticipants 0.47 0.59 0.38 0.69
To participants 0.49 0.78 0.40 0.85*
Political ties
To all residents 0.27 0.43 0.28 0.38
To nonparticipants 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.06
To participants 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.31
Religious ties
To all residents 0.48 0.30 0.50 0.31
To nonparticipants 0.20 0.16 0.22 0.15
To participants 0.28 0.14 0.28 0.17
Proximity ties
To all residents 8.57 13.46*** 8.50 12.44**
To nonparticipants 4.29 6.65*** 4.22 6.21**
To participants 4.28 6.81*** 4.28 6.23**
Kinship first degree
(continued)
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importance of family ties makes intuitive sense if we see connections as channels
for social influence. Given the violent, antisocial nature of the collective action
involved, the emotional power of kinship bonds could exert a particularly strong
influence and overcome prosocial, peaceful norms that may otherwise govern
individual behavior. I discuss possible mechanisms in more depth in the qualita-
tive analysis.
The significance of proximity ties is somewhat different. Ties to neighbors increased
the likelihood of participation regardless of whether the neighbor was himself a parti-
cipant or not in the violence (Table 4, model 5). This may make intuitive sense if we
also see ties as channels for the diffusion of information. As social interaction likely
increases with spatial proximity, the more neighbors one has the more information
one would likely receive. I present the evidence of such a diffusion mechanism later.
Although tests for multicollinearity did not indicate problematic levels, it is worth
noting the potential correlationbetween kinship and proximity ties in theRwandan rural
sociocultural context. Rwandan families often lived close together, sometimes occupy-
ing the same hill, in part because Rwandan fathers customarily gifted land to their sons
uponmarriage to establish their ownhouseholds. The significanceofproximity ties then
may also reflect some of the significance of the kinship ties.
Connection Strength. In addition to the type of tie, the strength of the tie mattered. Ties
based on the first degree of canonical consanguinity—parents, siblings, and
children—are a substantively stronger predictor of participation than ties based on
weaker, more distant degrees of consanguinity—uncles, grandparents, cousins, and
so on. In probabilistic terms, using convicts as the dependent variable, the odds of an
individual joining the violence more than doubled when a close family member also
participated in the violence (Table 4, model 8). If a more distant family member
participated, the odds of participation also increased but only half as much as if it
were a close family member (Table 4, model 9). Some caution, however, is needed
in drawing an inference about tie strength as a statistically significant result is not
Table 2. (continued)
Nonconvicts
Convicts
only
All
nonsuspects
All
suspects
To nonperpetrators 0.24 0.16 0.21 0.23
To perpetrators 0.24 0.51** 0.24 0.46*
Kinship second degreeþ
To nonperpetrators 0.70 1.05 0.66 1.02
To perpetrators 0.70 1.89*** 0.62 1.73***
Note. Mean values, n ¼ 116.
*, **, and ***indicate difference statistically significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively
levels using t-test.
McDoom 15
 at London School of Economics & Political Sciences on April 24, 2014jcr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
replicated when suspects are specified as an alternate dependent variable. Nonethe-
less, the finding for convicts would be consistent with the interpretation suggested
for the more general finding that family ties exert a stronger influence on individuals
than social, economic, political, or religious ties. Stronger ties may be needed to
draw individuals into high-risk activities such as violence and to break basic proso-
cial bonds of humanity between individuals. Tie ‘‘strength’’ then may be closely
related to connection ‘‘type.’’
Countervailing Connections
While a high number of countervailing ties to nonparticipants appears substantively
to lower the likelihood of participation, the effect is not statistically significant. This
is true for both convicts (Table 3, model 2) and suspects. It is also true for kinship,
social, economic, political, religious, and neighborly ties (Table 4, model 6). Having
a family member who does not participate, for example, does not appear to counter-
act the influence of a family member who does participate in the violence. One pos-
sible interpretation of this finding is that inaction has a less influential effect than
action. If a nonparticipant did not act to stop another individual from participating,
then the actions of a participant would likely prevail. To borrow a popular adage,
‘‘all it takes for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing.’’
Table 3. Predictors of Participation (roster method, convicts as dependent variable).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Age (years) 0.95 (0.03) 0.96 (0.03) 0.96 (0.03) 0.98 (0.03)
Marital status (married) 3.41 (2.71) 3.54 (2.88) 4.25* (3.27) 2.91 (2.32)
Occupation status
(nonfarmer)
8.82*** (6.43) 8.00*** (6.04) 6.29*** (4.35) 7.40*** (5.36)
Education (years) 0.97 (0.08) 0.98 (0.08) 0.93 (0.07) 0.92 (0.07)
Wealth subjective (poor) 1.02 (0.12) 1.02 (0.13) 1.08 (0.13) 1.05 (0.13)
Wealth objective (cows
owned)
0.89 (0.43) 0.94 (0.46) 0.72 (0.33) 0.73 (0.36)
Opposition support (yes) 1.23 (0.62) 1.20 (0.61) 1.19 (0.57) 1.19 (0.59)
All ties to residents 1.09*** (0.03)
To nonparticipants only 0.96 (0.07)
To participants only 1.24*** (0.09)
All voluntary ties 0.98 (0.08)
To nonparticipants only 0.83 (0.21)
To participants only 1.18 (0.21)
All involuntary ties 1.20** (0.11)
To nonparticipants only 0.73 (0.19)
To participants only 1.71*** (0.31)
Pseudo R2 0.196 0.221 0.139 0.192
Note. n ¼ 116. Logistic regressions. Odds ratio reported with robust standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, and ***indicates statistically significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.
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Control Variables
Notwithstanding the theoretical disagreement over whether perpetrators possess
distinguishing characteristics, the most robust individual attribute—beyond being
Table 4. Predictors of Participation by Connection Type (roster method, convicts as
dependent variable).
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Age (years) 0.96 (0.03) 0.99 (0.03) 0.96 (0.03) 0.98 (0.03)
Marital status (married) 3.75* (3.00) 2.36 (2.00) 4.07* (3.12) 3.19 (2.53)
Occupation status
(nonfarmer)
13.16*** (10.73) 15.53*** (13.84) 6.72*** (4.65) 7.61*** (5.57)
Education (years) 0.97 (0.09) 0.99 (0.10) 0.93 (0.07) 0.92 (0.07)
Wealth subjective (poor) 1.02 (0.14) 0.90 (0.14) 1.06 (0.13) 1.05 (0.13)
Wealth objective (cows
owned)
0.80 (0.42) 0.62 (0.36) 0.73 (0.34) 0.67 (0.33)
Opposition support (yes) 1.58 (0.88) 1.56 (0.92) 1.17 (0.57) 1.18 (0.59)
All kinship ties 1.36*** (0.15)
To nonparticipants 1.19 (0.33)
To participants 1.75*** (0.36)
All economic ties 1.07 (0.20)
To nonparticipants 0.70 (0.37)
To participants 1.54* (0.40)
All social ties 0.95 (0.11)
To nonparticipants 0.83 (0.37)
To participants 1.20 (0.32)
All political ties 1.45 (0.50)
To nonparticipants 0.61 (0.52)
To participants 2.63 (1.63)
All neighbor/proximity
ties
1.13*** (0.04)
To nonparticipants 1.20 (0.15)
To participants 1.08 (0.13)
All religious ties 0.49 (0.23)
To nonparticipants 1.17 (0.92)
To participants 0.31 (0.22)
Kinship first degree ties 1.19 (0.25)
To nonparticipants 0.35* (0.22)
To participants 2.10** (0.71)
Kinship second degree
þ ties
1.22** (0.11)
To nonparticipants 0.96 (0.22)
To participants 1.60** (0.35)
Pseudo R2 0.276 0.339 0.152 0.207
Note. n ¼ 116. Logistic regressions. Odds ratio reported with robust standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, and ***indicates statistically significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.
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male—was occupational status. Individuals who had income other than from farm-
ing—mechanics, guards, carpenters in my sample—were more likely to participate.
One possible interpretation is that those dependent on farming could not as readily
afford the opportunity cost of participating in a risky and time-consuming activity as
collective violence. The data also provide more contingent support for age and
marital status. Middle-aged, married men appear more likely to participate. In sum,
these findings suggest that both relational and attribute variables should be consid-
ered in predicting participation in collective behaviors.
Qualitative Evidence on Mechanisms
While the quantitative data predict that well-connected individuals are more likely to
be mobilized, the interview data provide better analytical traction on the mechan-
isms behind the observed correlation. They suggest the operation of diffusion,
influence, and regulatory mechanisms. To illustrate how networks fulfilled these
three functions, I present survey data and interview testimony from Rwandan com-
munities on (1) information diffusion: how information on the target and rationale
for violence first entered and circulated within communities; (2) recruitment
appeals: how individuals were selected and organized for violence; and (3) incen-
tives and sanctions: how material opportunities and the perceived costs of nonparti-
cipation regulated individual behavior.
Information Diffusion
Information on the genocide entered and circulated within communities through pre-
existing networks. Immediately following the president’s assassination on April 6,
1994, it was initially unclear to many Rwandans in rural communities what had hap-
pened or what would happen next. The sudden end to the twenty-one years of auto-
cratic rule represented a major macropolitical shock and created acute uncertainty
about the civil war’s outcome. Information quickly arrived in communities, how-
ever, that (1) attributed the assassination to the Tutsi and identified them as the
enemy and (2) called upon Hutu to defend themselves and mobilize against the Tutsi
enemy. The majority of respondents reported they acquired this information locally.
Only 6 percent indicated the radio was the source (Table 5).
The survey data illustrate the initial uncertainty created by the president’s assas-
sination and the subsequent arrival of information from outside of communities.
Sixty-four percent of Hutu respondents reported initial cooperation across ethnic
lines following Habyarimana’s death (Table 5). Tutsi participated alongside them
in night patrols (irondo in Kinyarwanda) to look for the enemy, a fact corroborated
by 80 percent of Tutsi respondents. Yet more than 70 percent of Hutu respondents
also report that the enemy would eventually come to be identified as all Tutsi in their
communities. The implication is that information reached communities that altered
interethnic relations and defined Tutsi as the enemy out-group.
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Interview testimony corroborates the change in interethnic relations following the
assassination and suggests the information responsible for the shift often entered
communities through preexisting local networks. The following interview illustrates
how the arrival of this information divided the community into Hutu in-group and
Tutsi out-group:
What happened in your community after the president was killed?When Habyarimana
died the politicians said they [the Tutsi] had killed our leader. Then people’s hearts
changed. They said the enemy had killed our father. That extremist Rekeraho said
Table 5. Survey Data Supportive of an ‘‘Information Diffusion’’ Mechanism.
Hutu Tutsi
During the genocide, when the night patrols (irondo) first started, did the Tutsi in your
community also participate?
(n ¼ 260) (n ¼ 20)
Yes 64.0% 80.0%
No 36.0% 20.0%
During the genocide who did people in your community think was the enemy?
(open-ended)
(n ¼ 268) (n ¼ 21)
All and only Tutsi 70.5% 90.5%
All Tutsi and certain Hutu 20.6% 9.5%
RPF rebels only 1.9% 0.0%
Other response 1.1% 0.0%
Did people from your community organize to form attack groups?
(n ¼ 255) (n ¼ 16)
Yes 66.9% 100%
No 33.1% 0%
Unable/unwilling to say 5.9% 0.0%
Who told people in your community to organize attack groups to hunt Tutsi?
(open-ended)
(n ¼ 72) (n ¼ 8)
Individuals inside community 41.0% 62.5%
Individuals outside community 53.1% 37.5%
Radio 5.9% 0%
Note. RPF ¼ Rwandan Patriotic Front.
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we should wake up and fight for our survival.Who was Rekeraho? He was an MDR [an
opposition party] politician who lived in Mwendo. After a few days we started to see
smoke from Gigonkoro [the neighboring prefecture] from burning houses. Soon every-
one was afraid. Both Hutu and Tutsi. Who was burning the houses? They said those
who were doing the burning had covered themselves in banana leaves so you could not
see who they were. When people found out what was happening, the fear of the Hutu
decreased while the fear of the Tutsi increased as they now knew who was the enemy.
After a few days it was clear there were two groups: those being hunted and those who
hunted. (Leopold, nonparticipant, aged 32, Tare sector)
Leopold told us then that a local politician supplied both the information that
Tutsi were responsible for the assassination and that they were deemed the enemy.
The same politician also provided a rationale for mobilization: self-defense. In a
joint interview, a perpetrator and his wife described how this local politician
obtained the information through his political networks that contributed to his own
attitude change:
What was Rekeraho’s attitude toward Tutsi like? [Husband] On the 10th [of April
1994], there was a baptism of a Tutsi baby and Rekeraho was to conduct the ceremony.
The evening before, he went to Kambanda’s [the Tutsi father] house and there he even
offered a cow to a young Tutsi boy, who was single still, and said he would ask for a
girl’s hand in marriage. He had good relations with the Tutsi. When did he change?
[Wife] He attended meetings in Butare town and that is when he changed. What kind
of meetings? They were secret meetings involving other politicians. And when did it
change here in Tare? Rekeraho then began to hold secret security meetings at his house
with members of the MDR here and his old soldier friends. That is how the genocide
started here. (Oriel, Hutu participant aged 51, and Beatrice, wife aged 54, Tare sector)
Initially, Rekeraho had outwardly good relations with Tutsi in his community, but
later learned through his party political connections outside of the community that the
Tutsi were to be targeted. He then acted as a ‘‘bridging’’ connection between a central
and a peripheral network. He brought information from the main town to the rural
community. Rekeraho then circulated this information within the community through
his network of party supporters and friends who had also served in the military.
Influence: Recruitment Appeals
Once information on the target and the rationale for action reached communities,
residents were then organized into attack or hunting groups (ibitero in Kinyar-
wanda). Two-thirds of survey respondents indicate that the violence in their commu-
nities was not spontaneous, but in fact organized (Table 5). The recruitment process
was often face to face and recruiters targeted individuals in their social networks as
the following interview illustrates:
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Who told you to man the roadblock? It was the responsable of the cellule, Sibomana.
How did Sibomana summon you to the roadblock? It was before the umuganda [com-
pulsory labor] that he came to my house and told me to work on the roadblock. He said
no-one must stay at home. Do you live near Sibomana? Yes, I live nearby. How far? It
is on a hill. I live at the bottom, and Sibomana lives near the top, but you can call from
one to the other. Do you have family ties to Sibomana? No. We had an alliance founded
on religion. Sibomana’s mother was the godmother of my sister. Do you have any
economic links to Sibomana? Did you work for him? I was not poor. I did not work for
Sibomana.Were you friends? Yes. . . . How did you first know Sibomana?We grew up
together on the same hill. And we kept cows together and we went to each other’s house
because Sibomana’s mother was the godmother of my sister. (Deogratias, Hutu
participant, aged 48, Tare sector)
In a community of more than 1,000 individuals, it would be impossible for the cell
responsable to recruit everyone in this manner in such a short span of time. We learn,
however, that the two also share a personal, multiplex connection. They had been
neighbors since childhood, and the responsable’s mother was the godmother of his
sister. These ties may then explain why Sibomana selected Deogratias to work at the
roadblock.
Kinship ties were also important in recruitment. In the following interview, a
participant told us that the core group of killers in his community comprised three
related individuals. The senior relative, Karimunda, recruited his junior kin:
How did the genocide start in your community? Karimunda started it. People from
another cellule, Musekera, kept coming and asking why have you not started yet?
At first they burned some houses. Then, on Sunday the killing began. Karimunda
found his younger brother Philip and his nephew standing by the roadside with
some other young men and he told us we have work to do. We followed him and
we burned houses. . . . The next day the ibitero started at 7.00 a.m. People gath-
ered at the bar as Karimunda had told them to and they went hunting again. Then
at night they went on patrols. Why did you go? They forced us to do it because if
you missed it, they would fine you. Who forced you? It was Karimunda and his
relatives. Even the responsable of the cellule was forced to do it. (Jean-Paul, Hutu
participant, aged 38, Zivu sector)
In the next interview, a nonparticipant from the same community told us that the
same nephew was a ‘‘good man’’ before the genocide and implied that it was his
uncle who influenced him into committing ‘‘bad things’’:
What did people think of the organizers of the genocide? [read list of organizers]
Karimunda. He was a butcher and knew how to use a machete. He was the kind of man
who liked conflicts. When you met him you could see he was different from anyone
else. Even the councilor was afraid of him. Jean-Claude N.: He was Karimunda’s
nephew. Before the genocide he was a good man. But afterwards, because he was
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related to Karimunda, he went everywhere with him and did bad things together with
him. Philip S. [Emmanuel’s brother]: He worked together with Karimunda. They were
both very bad people. There was a time when he went to Buhoro with Karimunda and
they took spears with them. They came back smelling of blood. (Dionysie, Hutu non-
participant, Zivu sector)
Regulation: Incentives and Sanctions
Once the violence began, residents rapidly learned that there were material benefits to
joining attack groups as well as costs for refusing to participate when recruited. More
than half of survey respondents cited the opportunity to gain materially or financially
as the reason why other residents joined attack groups (Table 6). It was by far the most
common motivation reported. Participation in attack groups then presented an oppor-
tunity to loot. To benefit, however, you would need to know of the opportunity and the
plan of action. In the following interview, Leopold told us that this information was
Table 6. Survey Data Supportive of ‘‘Regulatory’’ Mechanism.
Hutu Tutsi
During the genocide, why do you think people joined attack groups (igitero) to hunt the Tutsi?
(open-ended, multiple answers permitted)
(n ¼ 186) (n ¼ 21)
They stood to gain financially or materially 53.1% 53.2%
It was the law/ordered by the authorities 16.9% 19.0%
They had been exposed to propaganda/ideology 13.9% 9.3%
They thought Tutsi were the enemy/collaborators 11.3% 18.8%
They believed the authorities would do nothing 9.4% 0.0%
They hated the Tutsi 7.6% 14.0%
They believed they were fighting for their country 3.5% 4.7%
They were physically threatened 3.2% 4.9%
They were defending themselves 2.4% 0%
They just did as everyone else did 1.1% 0.0%
They were angered by Habyarimana’s death 0.4% 0.0%
They stood to lose financially or materially 0.2% 0%
Some other reason 10.1% 14.4%
Unwilling/unable to answer 11.4% 0.0%
During the genocide, what happened to people who refused to join the attack groups?
(open ended)
(n ¼ 262) (n ¼ 20)
Nothing happened to them 65.2% 54.7%
They faced sanctions (social, monetary, or physical) 34.8% 45.3%
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acquired through membership of the attack group and that while coerced at first, par-
ticipants went voluntarily once they learned of the material advantages:
How did they decide whom to attack? When they attacked a home, somebody in the
group would say so and so had cows and then people would plan to meet there. In the
first few days people went by force. But later they went willingly because they saw they
could get property like roofing tiles and mattresses. Once the group reported that so and
so’s house had been completed, the extremists and the politicians would tell them
where to go next once. (Leopold again, Tare sector)
A refusal to participate also incurred costs. Interviews revealed three widely per-
ceived sanctions for being a refusenik: (1) social stigma, evidenced in the accusation
of ibyitso (collaborator); (2) monetary or in-kind material fines; or (3) physical harm:
What happened to those people did not go with the attack group? They would fine them
money and if they could not pay, then they would take their livestock. These people
were called ibyitso. Was anyone actually harmed for refusing? No one was killed in
my community. But I heard others were beaten up elsewhere. (Matthieu, Hutu partici-
pant, aged 52, Zivu sector)
The data, however, are conflicting on the consequences of nonparticipation.
Almost two-thirds of survey respondents also indicate nothing happened to refuse-
niks in their communities (Table 6). The discrepancy may reflect the evolution in
individual motivations to participate to which Leopold alluded. Individuals may
initially have been coerced. Subsequently, however, many may have participated
willingly once the material advantages became known, thereby obviating the need
to enforce the participation of more residents.
Alternative Interpretations of the Data
The research design permits descriptive rather than causal inferences. It predicts well-
connected individuals are more likely to participate, but it does not prove that their
connections explain why they participated. Unobserved heterogeneity may account for
the observed correlation between connectedness and participation. One alternative
interpretation is that the findings are attributable to homophily, the well-established
observation that ‘‘similarity breeds connection’’ or that ‘‘birds of a feather flock
together’’ (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). Participants may share some
unobserved characteristic that makes them prone to committing genocidal violence,
and it is this similarity that makes them seek out connections to each other.
Homophily is one of the well-known challenges to demonstrating causality using
observational network data in which the dependent and independent variables are
measured simultaneously (Fowler et al. 2011). It raises the question of endogeneity.
We cannot readily know whether it is the connection that is causing the similar
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behavior or whether it is the similar behavior that is causing the connection. One
method to control for homophily would be to observe changes in connections and
changes in the behavior over time. Such an empirical strategy, however, is practi-
cally infeasible for rare and difficult-to-observe behaviors such as participation in
genocidal violence.3 Nonetheless, in the absence of conclusive longitudinal data,
there remain five suggestive reasons for believing that participation in genocidal vio-
lence is attributable to the influence of social connections rather than to some unob-
served characteristic that participants share.
First, I control for many of the characteristics that extant theory and evidence sug-
gest may make individuals prone to such violence: age, marital status, education,
wealth, employment status, and ideological commitment. The statistical significance
of connections persists in the quantitative analysis. Second, the qualitative data are
corroborative and strongly suggest the importance of connections. They suggest net-
works diffused information on the rationale for mobilization and the targets of vio-
lence, enabled the use of interpersonal influence to recruit individuals into attack
groups, and regulated participation in the violence through incentives and sanctions.
Third, if the findings were due to some unobserved similarity between participants,
we would expect participants to have not only more connections to other participants
than do nonparticipants but also fewer connections to nonparticipants. Homophily
predicts participants would prefer connections to other participants because they
possess similar characteristics. Yet the descriptive statistics show that perpetrators
have more connections to both participants and nonparticipants. Moreover, these
differences are statistically significant. Fourth, it is widely accepted that homophily
does not account for all social connections between individuals and that some rela-
tionships are formed through simple availability (Fowler et al. 2011). The availabil-
ity effect would be particularly acute in the context of rural Rwanda where
individuals are tied to the land on which they subsist and where social and geo-
graphic mobility are consequently highly limited.
Finally, and particularly suggestively, I test for the relative importance of vol-
untary and involuntary connections and find involuntary connections to be a stron-
ger predictor of participation. Homophily assumes individuals voluntarily seek out
connections to each other because they share similar characteristics. To model the
potential for homophily, I coded as voluntary connections any relationships that
two individuals were freely able to enter and to end. In the context of rural
Rwanda, these included friendship, marriage, membership of a political party, and
membership of a voluntary organization. Conversely, I defined involuntary con-
nections as relationships that either one or both individuals could not freely enter
or end. In Rwanda, these most commonly included kinship blood ties and cliente-
list ties based on land, jobs, or other important economic benefits where clients
may be unwillingly tied to their patron. In both the name generator and roster mod-
els, involuntary ties proved statistically and substantively stronger than voluntary
ties in predicting participation. As many involuntary ties are also kinship ties, and
the power of kinship ties has already been noted, this result is unsurprising. In
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interpreting this finding, it should be noted I assume that preferences are socially
learned rather than biologically determined. Family members are not born with a
shared proclivity for violence but instead develop it over time through repeated
and prolonged interaction with each other. It is the kinship connection then that
leads to the similar proclivity.
Discussion and Conclusion
The evidence presented here reinforces the growing consensus that social networks
and social ties, the sources of social capital, have a dark side (Gargiulo and Benassi
1999; Swain 2003). The better connected an individual is to his community gener-
ally and to other participants specifically, the more likely he is to be drawn into
extreme antisocial group behavior such as genocidal collective violence. These
connections may supply individuals with pernicious information, expose them to
undesirable influences, and create nefarious incentives and sanctions. Family
members and neighbors appear to play particularly prominent roles in this process.
The perhaps counterintuitive implication is that social misanthropes may be less
likely to engage in such antisocial activities than the socially gregarious, given the
collective character of the violence. The interdependence created by strong social
bonds structurally constrains the freedom to act independently.
The evidence also draws sociological theory and political science research a little
closer together to reinforce the widening consensus that social structure is a key pre-
dictor of participation in various forms of violence. It suggests a relational approach
should complement the attribute approach that presently predominates in extant
research on participation. The atomistic quest for distinguishing demographic,
socioeconomic, attitudinal, or psychological attributes that may indicate a disposi-
tional susceptibility for such violence has largely proved elusive. It has led to the
consensus in genocide research that perpetrators are simply ‘‘ordinary’’ men (Brow-
der 2003). Yet I submit the inquiry should not be limited to the individual but should
extend to the social context in which he is embedded. The evidence here supports the
position in modern sociology, wherein structure and agency are complementary
rather than competing forces in explanations of social action (Giddens 1984). Both
pull (relational) and push (attributes) factors matter, and we should guard against
excessive determinism of either approach. While individuals are distinct atoms, they
are bound together in interdependent molecular structures. Who you knowmatters as
well as who you are.
Network structures may also provide an important link between micro and
macrolevels of analyses of human phenomena (Granovetter 1973). The growing
focus on the microfoundations of violence has for example revealed a ‘‘macro-
micro disjunction’’ (Kalyvas 2006). Macrovariables do not consistently predict
important microvariations in violence within complex and aggregated events
such as civil wars, ethnic conflicts, and genocides. In identity-based explana-
tions of violence, for example, it is unclear how a macrovariable such as
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ethnicity affects micro-level outcomes such as why certain individuals commit
violence and others not and why particular individuals are targeted but others
unharmed. The answer may lie in the complex set of social relations at the local
level that mediate participation and victimization (Fujii 2009). More generally,
local factors may matter for observed microvariations. The micropolitical,
microeconomic, and microsocial forces that shape patterns of violence at the
local level may themselves be shaped by the structure of local networks and ties
through which they flow.
Lastly, the evidence also provides some insight into the microdynamics of
Rwanda’s genocide. As often observed, Rwanda had the highest population den-
sity of all African states, a remarkable 305 persons/km2 in 1993. Rwanda’s geno-
cide, as previously noted, was also remarkable for the speed of the violence and the
scale of popular participation. These facts have led to speculation that the violence
was the product of some sort of neo-Malthusian resource crunch: too many people,
too little land (Andre´ and Platteau 1998). This article suggests, however, that the
extraordinary speed and scale of the violence may have sociological rather than
ecological origins. In highly densely populated societies likely exist highly dense
social networks. Highly dense networks often signify numerous connections exist
between individuals and that frequent face-to-face interaction occurs, particularly
in technologically simple societies where the means of communication and trans-
portation are basic. It is these many ties and frequent contact that enmesh individ-
uals, providing both opportunities for and constraints on actions. As already noted,
high network density improves the efficiency of collective action more broadly
(Gould 1993). Mass mobilization and rapid violent contagion, the remarkable fea-
tures of Rwanda’s genocide, may then have their roots in Rwanda’s remarkable
population density.
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Notes
1. The estimate is for 367,000 Hutu men to have committed category two crimes under
Rwanda’s 2004 genocide law. Broadly, category one crimes covered organizers and sexual
offenders; category two covered violent crimes against the person; and category three cov-
ered property crimes. The estimate is calculated by extrapolating data on conviction rates
personally collected at the local level from the pilot sample of gacaca communities. An
unofficial tally, based on the presently unreleased official gacaca report, puts the final
number of category two convictions at 361,590. See the ruling party’s website: http://rpfin-
kotanyi.org/wp/?p¼1958. Accessed January 16, 2013.
2. In April 1994, Rwanda comprised 11 prefectures, 145 communes, 1,545 sectors, and
9,000þ cells. A sector was home on average to about 800 households. In addition, in some
places there was a fifth layer. The nyumbakumiwere unpaid individuals representing a col-
lective of ten households. Rwanda’s 1991 Population Census reported a Tutsi population
of 8.4 percent.
3. Other strategies to improve causal inferences from network data include fixed effect mod-
eling, the use of instrumental variables, cross-lagged structural equation modeling, and
quasi-experimental research designs (see Mouw, 2006).
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